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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ONYX LIABLE FOR CONVERSION 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
As set forth in Defendants' Principal Brief, the express language of the governing 
statute requires that, in order for a buyer to take free of a previously perfected security 
interest in collateral that has been moved from another state, the buyer must be the 
recipient of "a certificate of title [ ] issued by this state" Utah Code Ann. Section 70A-9-
103(2)(d)(Supp. 1998)(the "Statute").1 While the practice of re-titling used vehicles 
purchased from out of state prior to resale is likely not followed routinely by car dealers in 
a position such as Rick Warner in the instant case, the express language of the Statute 
requires that they do so if they wish to provide their buyers with a clear title. 
While such a holding would admittedly impose a burden on auto dealers in Rick 
Warner's position, they must either bear that burden as a cost of doing business, or run the 
risk of the occasional loss if they fail or refuse to do so. If the industry perceives this 
1
 The language of the Statute is as follows: "If goods are brought into this state while 
a security interest therein is perfected in any matter under the law of the jurisdiction from 
which the goods are removed and a certificate of title is issued by this state and the 
certificate does not show that the goods are subject to the security interest or that they may 
be subject to security interests not shown on the certificate, the security interest is 
subordinate to the rights of a buyer of the goods who is not in the business of selling goods 
of that kind to the extent that he gives value and receives delivery of the goods after 
issuance of the certificate and without knowledge of the security interest." (Emphasis 
added). 
1 
result as unpalatable, they must seek relief from the legislature, rather than the judiciary, 
whose role is not to rewrite statutes, but rather to enforce them.2 
According to the express language of the Statute, if a car dealer in Utah wishes to 
avoid the risk of conveying a clouded title to its purchaser by reason of a previously 
perfected security interest in another state, it must first obtain a certificate of title in Utah. 
Indeed, this is precisely what occurred in Arrow Ford, Inc. v. Western Landscape 
Construction Co., 23 Ariz. App. 281, 532 P.2d 553 (1975), which makes Plaintiffs' 
advancement of Arrow Ford, Plaintiffs' Brief at 15-16, unavailing. 
Plaintiffs correctly summarize the pertinent facts of Arrow Ford, Plaintiffs' Brief 
at 15-16, which Defendants here resummarize to focus on the critical issue. The initial 
sale, from Arrow Ford to Ray Wood, in September 1971, was financed by Ford Motor 
Credit ("FMC") who perfected its security interest by obtaining a certificate of title in 
Texas listing it as the lienholder. Wood thereafter3 obtained a laundered title in Oklahoma. 
Wood then took the vehicle to Arizona, where he sold it to C&C Auto Sales. 
C&C thereafter did what Rick Warner has not done. That is, C&C obtained a 
certificate of title in "this state" (in the language of the Statute)(i.e., Arizona in Arrow 
2
 As this Court stated in Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1994): 
"A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that the courts are not to infer substantive terms 
into the text that are not already there. Rather, the interpretation used must be based on the 
language used, and the court has no power to rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not 
expressed. Mountain States Tel. & Teh Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 107 Utah 502, 155 P.2d 
184, 185 (1945), see Trittipo v. O'Brien, 561 N.E.2d 1201, 1203 (111. App.Ct. 1990) ("The 
statute should be interpreted on the basis of what was written, and courts should not search for 
any subtle or not readily apparent intention of the legislature.") 
3
 The date of issuance of the Oklahoma certificate of title is not provided. 
2 
Ford, or Utah in the instant case), on October 11, 1971.4 This critical distinction makes 
Arrow Ford unresponsive to Defendants' argument, and brings C&C into compliance with 
the language of Arizona's version of the Statute. Had Rick Warner obtained a certificate of 
title in "this state," (i.e., Utah) it could have thereafter conveyed clear title to Mahana, 
subject to the four month rule of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-103(2)(b)(Supp. 1998) as cited 
by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' Brief at 14. Plaintiffs' failure to meet their own obligations under 
the Statute should not result in liability to Defendants.5 
Paccar Financial Corp. v. J.L. Healy Const Co., 561 F.Supp. 342 (D.S.D. 1983) is 
also of limited application, since it was decided under the 1962 version of South Dakota's 
enactment of the then-existing Uniform Commercial Code section, rather than the 1972 
version which parallels the Statute at issue herein. While the Paccar court attempted to 
harmonize the two versions, its decision was clearly made on the previous version of the 
law. Id. at 347-48. Moreover, the court's analysis, whether under the 1962 or the 1972 
version of the South Dakota statute, did not focus on the language located in the last 
sentence of the relevant statutory language in the 1972 version, which states that, in order 
to obtain a certificate of title that is not subordinated to a previously perfected security 
4
 C&C later sold the vehicle to another auto dealer, who sold it to the end consumer on 
November 21, 1971, which consumer also obtained a certificate of title in Arizona. About four 
months thereafter, FMC, the original lender, sued to recover the vehicle or damages in the 
amount of its security interest. 
5
 Notably, had Onyx located the vehicle while it was in the possession of Rick Warner, 
Rick Warner's rights would have been subordinate to the rights of Onyx because Rick Warner 
is "in the business of selling goods of that kind." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-103(2)(d)(Supp. 
1998). 
3 
interest, the buyer must "give value . . . after issuance of the certificate [of title].55 Utah 
Code Ann. Section 70A-9-103(2)(d)(Supp. 1998). Significantly, the 1962 version of the 
statute, as cited by the Paccar court, 561 F. Supp. at 345, does not contain this language. 
The inclusion of such language in the 1972 version of the statute leads to the clear 
conclusion that a buyer, to obtain a clear title, must first (i.e., before giving value) obtain a 
certificate of title in his own state, or see to it that his seller does so. While Defendants 
have found no legislative history relating to, or additional case law interpreting this 
provision, two reasons for its enactment seem likely. First, by requiring a buyer to obtain 
or demand from the seller a certificate of title from "this state55 before purchasing, the 
buyer receives one additional assurance that the title is clean before purchasing. Second, 
requiring re-issuance of title gives the original perfected secured lender an additional 
source to search to assist in locating collateral previously held by an absconding debtor, 
and to thereafter repossess or re-perfect its security interest in same. 
Regardless of the reasons, the language is there, and cannot be ignored.6 Plaintiffs5 
argument7 and the trial court's holding are contrary to the express language of the Statute, 
and this Court should reverse and render a decision in Defendants5 favor on Mahana's claim 
for conversion of the vehicle. 
6
 Defendants raised this argument to the trial court, (R.181 at 177-76), but the trial 
court did not address it in holding defendants liable for conversion. (R.259). 
7
 In the same vein, commentators Anderson, White & Summers and Quinn, cited in 
Plaintiffs' Brief at 14, 19-20, fail to address the provision requiring that a purchaser give value 
after issuance of the certificate of title in "this state." 
4 
II. THE TRIAL'S AWARD OF $11,880.00 IN CONVERSION DAMAGES RESULTS 
IN AN IMPERMISSIBLE WINDFALL TO MAHANA BECAUSE (1) THE TOTAL 
VALUE OF THE VEHICLE AT THE TIME HE PURCHASED IT WAS $8,795.00; 
(2) HE HAD THE FREE USE OF SUBSTITUTE VEHICLES FOR THE WHOLE 
TIME HE WAS WITHOUT THE USE OF HIS VEHICLE; AND (3) THE VEHICLE 
WAS RETURNED TO HIM. 
In arguing to retain compensatory damages in the amount of $11,880 which were 
awarded to Mahana by the trial court as damages for the lost use of the vehicle, Plaintiffs 
cite at length8 the trial court's Memorandum Decision, R.579, apparently for the sole 
purpose of demonstrating to this Court the amount of time the trial court devoted to the 
opinion. While Defendants recognize that the trial court did, indeed, perform a good deal 
of review of the law regarding damages, and of the facts and circumstances of the case, in 
the end the basis for its decision is concentrated in one paragraph, which states: 
Although Mr. Mahana testified that the value of each of the cars provided was 
about the same as his truck and that he was satisfied with the arrangement, he 
couldn't tow jet skis, haul items for personal use or go camping with the cars. 
There was a sentimental value to Mr. Mahana from having a pickup truck as 
opposed to a car. Frankly the Court is cognizant that this 19 year old single 
male went from a pickup truck with equipment with a CD player, amplifier 
and additional speakers to a Dodge Neon. The ride, for him, was just not the 
same. 
Memo. Decision, R.579 at 574. 
Thus, in the final analysis, while making detailed recitation of the law regarding 
damages for conversion, the trial court ultimately awarded damages based on a highly 
Plaintiffs cite no less than three full pages, single spaced, of the trial court's opinion. 
Plaintiffs' Brief at 27-30. 
5 
intangible and speculative9 "loss" to Mahana. The award flies in the face of the fundamental 
purpose of compensatory damages, which, as Defendants demonstrated in their principal 
brief, is to compensate-not enrich-a wronged party. Lysenko v. Sawaya, 7 P.3d 783, 788 
(Utah 2000)(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 903, cmt. a (1979)): "the fundamental 
purpose of compensatory damages . . . is to place the plaintiff in the same position as if the 
tort had not been committed," Clayton v. Crossroads Equipment Co., 655 P.2d 1125, 
1130 (Utah 1982)(citing Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Co., 23 Utah 2d 1, 455 P.2d 197 
(1979)("a non-breaching party to a contract should receive an award which will put him in 
as good a position as he would have been in had there been no breach")). Defendants' 
Principal Brief at 21-23. 
The trial court's award of damages for two years' lost use of a vehicle, which vehicle 
was ultimately returned,10 during which time Mahana had the use of substitute vehicles free 
of charge, is clearly excessive under the circumstances. Assuming, arguendo, that this 
Court determines that Defendants are liable for conversion, the trial court's decision on the 
amount of damages assessed therefor should be reversed for a new trial on this issue. 
9
 It is well settled that damages based on speculation are not supportable. Seale v. 
Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1365 (Utah 1996)(citing Steingart v. Oliver, 198 Cal. App. 3d 406,243 
Cal. Rptr. 678, 681 (Ct. App. 1988). 
10
 Common sense, and Utah law, dictate that return of converted property constitutes a 
mitigation of damages suffered. Whittler v. Sharp, 43 Utah 419, 135 P. 112, 115 (Utah 1913). 
("The plaintiff cannot have the full value of the property converted and at the same time have 
the property itself.") 
6 
Plaintiffs' reliance on Ben Lomond, Inc. v. Campbell, 621 P.2d 1042, 1047 (Alaska 
1984) and Gregory v. Padilla, 379 P.2d 951, 956 (Alaska 1963), Plaintiffs' Brief at 31, is 
misplaced. Gregory is inapposite because the dispute there centered on whether fair 
market value rather than replacement value should have been utilized. Damages calculated 
by rental value were not at issue on appeal.11 
While Ben Lomond, at first blush, supports the facial assertion that "rental value/ 
loss of use damages may exceed the market value of the converted chattel," Plaintiffs' 
Brief at 31, it is clearly distinguishable from the instant case because Mahana had free use 
of substitute vehicles while he was not in possession of the pickup. The wronged party in 
Ben Lomond was not so fortunate, and was either without the use of the converted 
generator at issue, or was required to actually rent a replacement for at least some of the 
period.12 Here, had Mahana been on foot the whole time, or been required to either rent or 
purchase another vehicle, the court's decision would be more in line with the purpose of 
compensatory damages, and would be more analogous to Ben Lomond. However, given the 
clear distinction, the reasoning of Ben Lomond cannot be applied to bring the trial court's 
award in line with the compensatory purpose of damages. 
As discussed above, the only true loss to which Mahana can point for the lost use of 
the vehicle is the extremely nebulous value of "the ride," (i.e., the perceived difference 
11
 While there was limited testimony by the Gregory plaintiff as to rental value, that 
testimony was never completed at the trial level, and was not reviewed on appeal. Gregory, 
379P.2dat953andn.l. 
12
 The court's opinion is silent on what action the wronged party took. 
7 
between a pickup and the free substitute cars provided to Mahana), and awarding more than 
the total market value of the vehicle, which was ultimately returned, creates an 
impermissible windfall. Nelson v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 935 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1997)(decrying windfall damages 
which allow a plaintiff to recover more damages than actually suffered). 
If this Court affirms the trial courts holding that Defendants are liable in conversion, 
the matter should be remanded for a new trial on damages, with instructions to the trial 
court to assess damages that serve the goal of compensation, rather than enrichment. 
in. THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE DOES NOT APPLY, AND DEFENDANTS 
ARE ENTITLED TO A CREDIT AGAINST THE JUDGMENT FOR THE AMOUNT 
THAT PLAINTIFFS RECEIVED FROM MERCHANTS BONDING 
COMPANY. 
Plaintiffs' argument in support of the collateral source rule relies on a broad facial 
recitation of the collateral source rule as adopted in Utah. See, e.g., Dubois v. Nye, 584 
P.2d 823, 825 (Utah 1978); Suniland Corp. v. Radcliffe, 576 P.2d 847 (Utah 1978); 
Phillips v. Bennett, 439 P.2d 457 (Utah 1968), and Green v. Denver & Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Co., 59 F.3d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir. 1995)(cited at Plaintiffs5 Brief 36-
37). While Defendants do not disagree with Plaintiffs' recitation of the policy reasons 
supporting the collateral source rule as advanced in the foregoing cases and in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A, Plaintiffs' argument misses the point. As argued in 
Defendants' Principal Brief, the rule does not apply where, as here, the Defendants are 
8 
equally entitled to the benefit of the collateral payment.13 Plaintiffs fail to address this 
argument. 
As stated in Section 920A, comment b, of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and 
as cited in Plaintiffs' Brief at 38, "[t]he law does not differentiate between the nature of the 
benefits, so long as they did not come from the Defendant or a person acting for him." 
(Emphasis added). Thus, where payment comes from a Defendant or a person acting in his 
behalf, the Restatement recognizes a clear exception to the collateral source rule. In the 
instant case, the payment at issue (i.e., the bond funds) came from Merchants Bonding who, 
in the context of payment of funds, "act[ed] for" Defendants. This is so because Defendants 
were equally entitled to receive funds directly from Merchants Bonding for losses suffered 
as a result of the improper issuance of the Arizona certificate of title in favor of Sonny 
Nicholas. 
Under the reasoning of the Restatement, the bond issued by Merchants Bonding, 
having been for the benefit of anyone (including Defendants) injured by the improperly 
laundered title certificate, is not subject to the collateral source rule, and Defendants are 
entitled to credit therefor. 
Plaintiffs' analysis of GibbsM. Smith Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity, 949 P.2d 337, 345 
(Utah 1997)(" Gibbs") does not warrant a different result. Plaintiffs' recitation of the facts 
of Gibbs does not differ materially from that advanced by Defendants; Plaintiffs instead 
13
 Defendants' entitlement to bond proceeds is most clearly evidenced by the undisputed 
fact that Merchants Bonding paid $5,395.33 directly to Onyx. Plaintiffs voiced no objection to 
such payment. 
9 
attempt to distinguish Gibbs and Defendants' argument regarding Gibbs principally on the 
grounds that in Gibbs "the collateral benefit [ ] had come from a party that was possibly at 
fault for the loss, rather than from an independent source." Plaintiffs' Brief at 40. 
Plaintiffs' analysis actually underscores Defendants' point, and makes the reasoning of 
Gibbs directly applicable to the instant facts. 
Here, the payments at issue, although not coming directly from the wrongdoer (i.e. 
the original purchaser or his assignee who improperly laundered the vehicle's title in 
Arizona), were made as a direct result of that wrongdoer's action. As compared to the 
parties before the Court, who were all victims of the ultimate wrongdoer,14 Merchants, as 
bond issuer for the undisputedly and intentionally culpable party who laundered the 
certificate of title, stands in the shoes of that wrongdoer with regard to payments made. 
Thus, in the language of Gibbs, those payments "[came] from a party that was possibly at 
fault for the loss, rather than from an independent source," Gibbs, 949 P.2d at 345, 
and Defendants are entitled to credit in the amount of those funds. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
AGAINST ONYX WHERE THERE IS NO SETTLED LAW TO 
DETERMINE WHO, AS BETWEEN ONYX AND MAHANA, HAD A 
PRIORITY INTEREST IN THE VEHICLE. 
Plaintiffs' principal argument supporting the trial court's award of punitive damages, 
and in response to Defendants' arguments against punitive damages, is essentially twofold: 
(1) that punitive damages were assessed for not only the actions which the trial court 
14
 If the parties had been able to locate the true wrongdoer in this case, and subject him 
to the jurisdiction of the Court, he would undoubtedly have ultimate liability for the damages 
suffered by all parties in this case. 
10 
determined constituted conversion, but because of Onyx's actions after the alleged 
conversion occurred, Plaintiffs' Brief at 42-43; and (2) that the trial courts' determination 
that punitive damages should be awarded was "predominantly a question of fact," and 
Defendants did not marshal the evidence to refute such finding. Plaintiffs' Brief at 44-45. 
With regard to the Plaintiffs' first argument, the propriety of Defendants' actions 
after the alleged conversion occurred is necessarily premised on whether it could have 
reasonably believed it had not committed conversion in respossessing the vehicle. If the 
trial court had determined, as it admitted it was a possible result,15 or this Court holds, that 
Defendants' repossession of the pickup was proper and did not constitute conversion, ipso 
facto Defendants' actions thereafter (i.e., arranging for transport and sale of the vehicle) 
could not have been improper, because they had the right to repossess it. Thus, the "close 
call" argument raised by Defendants at pages 26-30 of their Principal Brief remains the 
pivotal issue, notwithstanding the trial Court's criticism of Onyx's post-repossession 
actions. 
With regard to the second argument regarding marshaling of evidence, Plaintiffs are 
simply incorrect, for two reasons. First, the trial Court's determination that Defendants 
were liable for punitive damages was clearly set forth as a conclusion of law, not as a 
15
 The judge stated: "Well, most of the solutions were not crystal clear. It wasn't easy 
for me to discern, and I am not confident that the Supreme Court will give it a good thought 
when they face it again, and doesn't that factor in? I mean, this is a complicated scenario. 
And it isn't plainly and clearly answered by a statute, even though I deduced a legislative 
intent, boy, that conclusion doesn't [leap out] from the language of the statute, does it?" 
(R.697)(cited in Defendants' Principal Brief at 28). 
11 
finding of fact. (R.635 ffif 14,15).16 Second, as Plaintiffs recognize, the gravamen of 
Defendants5 "close call" argument is that, because, as recognized by the trial court, the 
parties' rights herein are not "plainly and clearly answered by a statute," (R.697), 
Defendants could not have intentionally or recklessly disregarded same, and it is improper 
to assess punitive damages against them. This "novel question of law" argument is clearly 
legal, not factual, in nature, and marshaling of evidence is not required. Wardley Better 
Homes and Gardens v. Cannon, 61 P.3d 1009, 1015 (Utah 2002). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, this Court should reverse the trial court's judgment 
holding Onyx liable for conversion and liable for punitive damages, and render judgment in 
favor of Onyx. In the event the Court determines not to reverse and render, Onyx requests 
that this Court reverse the trial court's decision regarding the amount of compensatory 
damages awarded to Mahana for lost use of the subject vehicle, remand for a new trial on 
that issue, reverse the trials courts' decision regarding the collateral source rule and direct 
that the trial court order that Onyx be given credit against any judgment rendered after a 
16
 Significantly, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the trial court 
on August 9, 2001, were drafted by Plaintiffs in the first instance. (See loose documents in 
second Court file, and proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law accompanying 
Plaintiffs' Counsel's letter dated July 18, 2001 these loose documents were not in the file when 
Defendants' prepared their Principal Brief and appear to have been inserted by the trial court 
since that time, but bear no record pagination numbers. Apparently there was a systemic filing 
problem at that time, because neither Plaintiffs July 18, 2001 submission of proposed Findings 
of Facts and Conclusions of Law, nor Defendants' Objection thereto is included in the original 
file (R.618). Plaintiffs, having proposed these items to the court as Conclusions of Law, should 
not now be able to benefit from re-characterizing the pronouncement of the trial court based on 
their own proposal. 
12 
new trial in the amount of $10,789.67, for the funds paid to Plaintiffs by Merchants 
Bonding, and reverse the trial court's award of punitive damages against Onyx. 
^5(// 
DATED this W day of April, 2003. 
Curtis R. Hussey 
Counsel for Defend; Hants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this IIA Say of April, 2003,1 caused to be served 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing document by First Class Mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
P. Bryan Fishburn 
Fishburn & Associates 
4505 South Wasatch Blvd., #215 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
13 
ADDENDUM 
Tab No. Description Record Page No. 
1. Plaintiffs' proposed Findings of Fact and N/A 
Conclusions of Law and cover letter dated 
July 18,2001. 
Tabl 
»"»T 
FISHBURN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. » RG f . 0 1,: . • - 1 . 1 : f 
Attorneys At Law 
Phone (801) 277-3445 Fax (801)277-0333 n* 
4505 South Wasatch Boulevard Suite 215 ? 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
July 18, 2001 
Honorable James R. Taylor 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
125 North 100 West 
Provo,Utah 84603 
RE: MAHANAv.ONYX - Civil No. 990400472 
F&A#08732.2 
Dear Judge Taylor: 
Enclosed for your review and consideration are proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. The proposed Findings and Conclusions were served on Onyx1 counsel by 
mail July 2, 2001. On July 18,1 received from Onyx suggested revisions. I incorporated several, 
which are reflected in the enclosed document. I chose not to adopt most of Onyx' suggestions, 
however. 
I believe that the proposed Findings and Conclusions comport with the Court's rulings 
and I ask that they be adopted. 
I have asked counsel for Onyx to file objections to form by this Friday, July 205 2001, if it 
chooses to do so. 
Sincerely, 
FISHBURN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
P.BiyanFishburn 
PBF:jjs 
Enclosure 
cc: Curt Hussey, Esq. (letter + enclosure via US mail and fax. 375-3865) 
FISHBURN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
P. BRYAN FISHBURN, ESQ. (#A4572) 
4505 South Wasatch Boulevard, Suite #215 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
Telephone: (801) 277-3445 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS S. MAHANA and RICK 
WARNER TOYOTA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ONYX ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION 
and GLS RECOVERY, INC., 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 990400472 
Judge James Taylor 
* * * * * * * 
The Court makes the following Findings of Fact, based (a) on the mutual and 
undisputed facts stated by parties in reference to their cross-motions for summary and partial 
summary judgment (on liability) and (b) on the evidence and testimony received at trial. The 
trial was held in two stages: April 3 and 4, 2001 and June 14, 2001. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In early 1995, Thomas and Silvia Hartley purchased a 1994 Mazda pickup 
(hereinafter "the pickup") from a dealer in Fontana, California. 
2. The Hartleys' purchase was financed by Onyx Acceptance Corporation. 
copy 
3. Onyx is a publicly traded Delaware corporation based in California. It is in the 
business of financing vehicle purchases. It operates in at least 20 states and according to its 
1999 Annual Report to Shareholders, has relationships with more than 7,600 motor vehicle 
dealers. In 1999, Onyx financed and purchased over $1.5 billion in installment or lease 
contracts on motor vehicles. 
4. Onyx5 assets exceed $393 million, according to its 1999 Annual Report. 
5. Onyx' net stockholders equity at the end of 1999 exceeded $53 million. 
6. The portfolio of motor vehicle loans that Onyx services exceeds $2.5 billion. 
7. The Hartleys gave to Onyx a security interest in the pickup to secure their 
repayment and other obligations under their installment contract with Onyx. The Onyx lien 
was perfected in California by issuance of a certificate of title on March 26, 1995 listing Onyx 
as a lien holder. 
8. After making a very few payments, the Hartleys stopped making payments and 
defaulted on their obligations to Onyx. 
9. Onyx unsuccessfully tried to find the Hartleys in California and repossess the 
pickup. 
10. At some point after their purchase, the Hartleys removed the pickup to Arizona. 
It is unclear exactly when this occurred, but it was sometime prior to August 24, 1995 when 
the pickup was re-titled in Arizona to Sonny Nicholas. 
11. Onyx did not re-perfect its security interest within four months after the Hartleys 
removed the pickup to Arizona. 
12. On August 24, 1995, the State of Arizona issued a certificate of title on the 
pickup. This certificate of title showed Sonny Nicholas as the owner. It indicated there were 
no liens on the pickup. 
13. It appears that Nicholas transferred title to Mike Fostino, as a second certificate 
of title was issued by the State of Arizona on August 29, 1995. This certificate of title showed 
Mike Fostino as the owner. It indicated there were no liens on the pickup. 
14. Endorsements on the back of the Fostino certificate of title indicate that Fostino 
transferred title to an Arizona used car dealer, who transferred title to a second Arizona used 
car dealer (Chadwick Auto Sales), before the pickup was purchased by Rick Warner Toyota. 
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15. Rick Warner Toyota, a licensed motor vehicle dealer in Orem, Utah, purchased 
the pickup through Southwest Auto Auction in Chandler, Arizona in September 1995. 
16. Subsequent to purchase Southwest delivered to Warner the second Arizona 
certificate of title, which was endorsed over to Warner. 
17. Warner purchased the pickup in the ordinary course of its business. 
18. Warner reasonably relied on a clean Arizona certificate of title on which Onyx' 
lien did not appear, in purchasing the pickup and, later, in selling it to Mahana. 
19. Warner did not know that Onyx previously had perfected a lien on the pickup, 
recorded on a California Certificate of Title. Warner did not know the Hartleys, Nicholas or 
Fostino and had no dealings or communications with them. 
20. On December 18, 1995, Warner sold the pickup to Chris Mahana for $8,795. 
The terms were $1,000 cash down with the balanced financed over time by Zions First 
National Bank. 
21. Warner applied for a Utah Certificate of Title with the State of Utah, to whom it 
surrendered the Arizona-Fostino Certificate of Title. 
22. The State of Utah issued a Certificate of Title which showed Mahana and Oren 
Shepard (Mahana's grandfather) as owners, with Zions First National Bank as the lien-holder. 
23. Shepard cosigned on the Zions loan. However, he claims no ownership interest 
in the pickup. 
24. Mahana did not know Hartley, Nicholas, or Fostino and had no knowledge on 
the vehicle's prior ownership. Mahana did not know Onyx previously had a lien on the 
pickup. 
25. Mahana purchased a CD player, an amplifier and speakers, which he had 
installed in the pickup. The cost of these items was $795.89. 
26. Mahana kept current his loan payments to Zions First National Bank. 
27. Sometime in mid 1998, Onyx stepped up its effort to find Hartley and the 
pickup. 
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28. Onyx traced the pickup to Arizona. When Onyx learned that the pickup had been 
re-titled in Arizona, it hired Tucson Recovery Bureau in Arizona to locate and repossess it. 
The company provided Onyx an address for Mike Fostino, which the Court concludes was 
obtained from the Arizona certificate of title that showed Fostino as the owner. 
29. In the course of its effort to find the pickup, Onyx came to believe that Fostino 
was a name assumed by Thomas Hartley, although it is not clear what prompted that 
conclusion. No evidence was presented that would prove or verify Onyx' speculation on this 
point. 
30. Onyx retained Renegade Research and Investigation Services, Mobile, Alabama, 
to help it locate Thomas Hartley and the pickup. On November 13, 1998, Renegade 
determined and advised Onyx that it had traced the pickup to Utah and that Utah license plates 
(number 535ZUS) had been issued to "Chris Mehana [sic] or Oren Shepard," 1156 S. 900 E., 
Provo, Utah 84606. Renegade cautioned Onyx as follows: "LOOK AT THE NAME IT IS 
DIFFERENT THAN THE CUST NAME YOU GAVE ME!" 
31. Onyx, based on information it had ascertained and that had been presented to it, 
had substantial reason to doubt the priority and status of its lien. 
32. Notwithstanding Renegade's cautionary message, and without any further effort 
to ascertain the current status of title to the pickup or to determine who had the right to possess 
it, Onyx that same day faxed to GLS Recovery in Or em, Utah a written " Authorization to 
Repossess." The Authorization advised GLS that the pickup was in the possession of a third 
party, "Chris Mehana." The authorization nonetheless directed GLS to pick up the vehicle and 
hold it pending further instructions. 
33. GLS assigned its employee, Alvin Losee, to pick up the vehicle. 
34. On November 16, 1998, Losee located the pickup in the parking lot at Mahana's 
place of employment, Home Depot in Lehi. 
35. Losee first loaded the pickup on a flatbed truck, then went into Home Depot to 
demand the keys from Mahana. Mahana was summoned to the front of the store, where Losee 
informed Mahana that his pickup had been repossessed and demanded the keys to the vehicle. 
When Mahana asked why his pickup was being repossessed, Losee replied that Mahana had 
defaulted on his loan and owed over $10,000. Mahana told Losee he had paid less than 
$10,000 for the pickup and that he was current on his loan payments. Losee replied that he 
was not interested in Mahana's explanation. 
36. In the pickup, among other things, were a case of CDs, a pair of sunglasses that 
cost $150, registration and proof of insurance, and miscellaneous items in the glove 
compartment. 
A 
37. Among Losee's responsibilities was to inventory personal property found in 
repossessed vehicles. The Court does not believe the claim of Mr. Losee, made at trial, that 
there were absolutely no items of personal property, whatever, in Mahana's pickup when he 
inventoried the contents of the pickup. The aforementioned items, in the pickup when it was 
repossessed, disappeared and were never returned to Mahana. 
38. No one else was present when Losee checked Mahana's pickup for personal 
property. GLS does not require that more than one employee witness or be involved in doing 
an inventory of personal property. 
39. Mahana immediately called Zions and asked why his pickup had been 
repossessed. Zions responded that it had not repossessed the pickup and confirmed that 
Mahana was not in default on its loan. 
40. Mahana, following the conversation with Zions, called police and advised that 
his pickup had been stolen. The police later advised Mahana that GLS had repossessed the 
pickup on instructions by Onyx. 
41. Mahana and his father drove to GLS to request that the pickup be returned. 
They advised GLS that Mahana owned the pickup and had purchased it 3 years before from 
Warner. GLS nonetheless refused to return it, explaining that Onyx had a lien and had given it 
instructions to repossess the pickup. GLS called the police and had Mahana and his father 
removed from the premises. 
42. GLS also received a telephone message from Zions, which indicated it held a 
Certificate of Title and that the title showed it as the lien-holder. GLS forwarded this message 
to Onyx in California. The message was handled by Onyx5 skip tracer on the Hartley account, 
Caesar Ravenna in California. 
43. Ravenna also received a message from Warner's sales manager, Larry Terry. 
Terry explained that Warner had purchased the vehicle at an auction in Arizona and that the 
Arizona Title endorsed to Warner showed no liens. Terry told Ravenna that Onyx had no right 
to have taken Mahana's pickup. 
44. Ravenna also received a phone message from Mahana's mother, protesting that 
Onyx had no right to take the pickup and threatening to report the vehicle as stolen. 
45. Immediately following repossession Onyx thus received reports from three 
different sources, all of whom indicated that Mahana owned the pickup and that a Utah title 
showed Mahana as the owner and Zions First National Bank (not Onyx) as the lien-holder. 
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46. Ravenna reported the messages from Zions, Warner and Mahana's mother to 
two of his supervisors and asked what to do. Their response was"we will need to move unit 
immediately55 and out of Utah "ASAP.55 
47. Onyx ignored Mahana's and Warner's demands for immediate return of the 
pickup to Mahana. 
48. Onyx decided to remove the vehicle from Utah and sell it while deliberately 
ignoring substantial evidence that should not have proceeded. 
49. Onyx promptly entrusted the vehicle to a truck transporter who operated under 
the name "No Procrastination Joe Boyland" who moved the vehicle out of the state. 
50. Despite the communications advising of Mahana's ownership of the vehicle, the 
only reason Onyx offered for immediately removing the vehicle from Utah was to avoid 
paying GLS storage fees of $8 a day. 
51. Onyx made no effort to ascertain the legal status of title and right of repossession 
notwithstanding that it (1) knew that a new certificate of title had been issued in Arizona to a 
Mike Fostino on which its lien was not recorded; (2) had been cautioned by Renegade that the 
pickup was licensed in Utah to a Chris Mahana and not Hartley; and (3) received immediately 
following repossession the messages from Zions , Warner and Mahana. 
52. Onyx issued a notice of repossession and intent to sell, which it mailed to 
Hartley's old address in California, even though it knew he no longer lived there. It provided 
no notice to and did not correspond with Mahana, even though it knew he claimed ownership 
and that there was evidence to support his claim. 
53. The reason Onyx gave for not giving notice to Mahana was that it would disrupt 
the normal operating procedure followed by its employees. 
54. Onyx moved the pickup out of state to Nevada, where it was sold before the end 
of the year. 
55. Onyx' action left Mahana with no vehicle to drive and an unpaid loan with 
Zions. He was also deprived of all his personal property in the pickup. 
56. Notwithstanding that he no longer had the pickup, Mahana continued loan 
payments to Zions in order to protect his credit. 
57. Warner provided Mahana with a series of vehicles to drive without charge. 
Most of the cars provided were intermediate sized cars. All of the cars were from Warner's 
inventory. 
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58. Although the cars provided for Mahana's use satisfied most of his transportation 
needs, there were activities for which he had used the pickup but could not use the cars. 
Mahana did not perceive the cars to be the equivalent of the pickup, although they did provide 
for most of his transportation needs. Average rental charge for a pickup would have been 
substantially higher than for intermediate-sized cars of like age. 
59. Onyx returned the pickup to Mahana about April 4, 2000, having apparently 
repurchased it. 
60. Warner ceased loaning cars to Mahana when Onyx finally returned the pickup 
to him. 
61. The aggregate depreciated value of the vehicles that Warner loaned to Mahana 
totaled $2,075.00. 
62. When returned to Mahana, the pickup was missing the amplifier and speakers, 
which had been installed behind the back seat. The front of the CD player had been torn off, 
which rendered the CD player inoperable. None of the personal property that had been in the 
pickup, the CDs and the sunglasses, was returned. Additionally, there was over 10,000 more 
miles on the odometer than when Onyx took it on November 16, 1998. 
63. The CDs that were missing from Mahana's truck belonged to a friend, whom he 
reimbursed by purchasing for him replacement CDs of comparable quality. Mahana's cost to 
replace the CDs was $100. 
64. The Court finds that the damages approximate to compensate Mahana for the 
loss of his personal property to be as follows: 
$795.89 CD stereo player/amplifier & speakers 
$100.00 Case of CDs 
$150.00 Sunglasses 
$1,045.89 Total 
65. The Court finds that the appropriate measure of damages for Mahana's lost use 
of his pickup from November 16, 1998 until it was returned to Mahana in April 2000 is 
$11,880.00. 
66. Onyx ordered GLS to repossess Mahana's pickup, moved it out of state, and 
sold it without notice to Mahana while deliberately ignoring substantial evidence that it should 
not have proceeded. 
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67. Onyx had provided Caesar Ravenna, its skip tracer, with no instruction, training, 
or guidance on what to do if: 
a) a debtor had taken collateral to another state; 
b) a debtor had sold collateral in another state; 
c) collateral had been re-titled to another person in a foreign state with no 
indication of Onyx' prior lien; or 
d) collateral had been re-titled in multiple states, multiple times, and Onyx' lien 
had disappeared from certificates of title in the process; or 
e) the vehicle had been removed from California for more than four months. 
68. Notwithstanding the large number of loans it services, Onyx apparently had no 
established procedure to follow if circumstances such as those mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph occurred. 
69. Onyx had no policies or procedures and no specific training in place for 
supervisors that would guide them in circumstances such as those that occurred in this case. 
70. By clear and convincing evidence, Onyx' conduct exhibited a knowing and 
reckless indifference toward and a disregard for the rights of Chris Mahana. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Conclusions of law made by this Court were previously set forth in three Memoranda 
Decisions dated September 23, 1999, April 9, 2001, and June 20, 2001, which are incorporated 
herein by reference. In addition, the Court articulates the following conclusions: 
1. Onyx no longer held a perfected lien on the pickup when it authorized GLS to 
take the pickup from Mahana. 
2. Onyx lost its lien after the pickup had been removed from California for more 
than four months and Onyx had not re-perfected its security interest in the foreign states to 
which it had been removed and the foreign states (Arizona and later Utah) issued certificates of 
title that no longer showed Onyx' lien. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-103; Arrow Ford, Inc. v. 
Western Landscape Construction Co., 552 P.2d 553 (Ariz. App. 1995); Paccar Financial Corp. 
v. J.L. Healv Construction Co., 561 F.Supp. 342 (D.S.D. 1983). 
3. As of November 1998, the security interest in the pickup claimed by Onyx was 
subordinate to the rights of Mahana as the new owner. Utah Code Ann.§70A-9-103(2)(b) &(d). 
4. Onyx and GLS wrongfully took Mahana's pickup and the items of personal 
property inside the pickup when they repossessed it. 
5. Onyx and GLS are liable to Mahana in tort for conversion. See Clayton v. 
Crossroads Equipment Company, 655 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1982). 
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6. Onyx and GLS are jointly and severally liable to Chris Mahana in the amount of 
$1,045.89 plus prejudgment interest from November 16, 1998 for conversion of the personal 
property in the pickup when repossessed. 
7. Onyx and GLS are jointly and severally liable to Chris Mahana in the amount of 
$11,880 plus prejudgment interest from the date the vehicle was returned, for conversion and 
Mahana's lost use of the pickup. 
8. The law implies a warranty of title in the connection of the sale of a vehicle, 
such as the sale from Warner to Mahana in December 1995. 
9. As between Warner and Onyx, the court concludes for the reason stated in its 
April 9, 2001 decision that the loss represented by the depreciated value of vehicles Warner 
loaned Mahana should be borne by Onyx. As between Warner and Onyx, Onyx is the more 
culpable party. 
10. Warner has established by a preponderance of the evidence the elements of an 
implied equitable indemnity claim against Onyx. Salt Lake City Sch.Dist v. Galbraith & 
Green. Inc., 740 P.2d 284, 2887 (Utah App. 1987). 
11. Warner is entitled to recover of Onyx under the theory of implied equitable 
indemnity the sum of $2,075, plus prejudgment interest thereon at 10 percent per annum from 
April 4, 2000 until entry of judgment. 
12. The collateral source rule bars any offset in favor of Defendants attributable to a 
collateral recovery on a surety bond issued by Merchants Bonding Company and purchased by 
Sonny Nicholas. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A; Dubois v. Nye, 584 P.2d 1125 (Utah 
1982). 
13. The collateral source rule bars any offset in favor of Defendants attributable to 
the value of the benefit bestowed upon Mahana by Warner in loaning him vehicles to drive 
until Onyx returned the pickup. 
14. The evidence is clear and convincing that Onyx engaged in conduct that 
demonstrated a knowing and reckless indifference toward and a disregard of the rights of Chris 
Mahana. 
15. The actions and conduct of Onyx in this case warrant an award of punitive 
damages against it, in Mahana's favor. 
16. Having analyzed the factors enumerated in Crookston v. Fire Insurance 
Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 808 (Utah 1991), the Court concludes that the amount of punitive 
damages appropriate in this case to be $25,000.00. See Memorandum Decision, June 21, 2001. 
DATED this day of , 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
By: 
The Honorable James R. Taylor, Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing [Proposed] FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was faxed and was mailed, postage pre-paid, on this 
Id day of July, 2001, to: 
Evan A. Schmutz 
Curtis R. Hussey 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, LC. 
Jamestown Square, Suite 200 
3319 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
FAX NO: (801) 801-375-3865 
P. Bryan Fishburn 
NOTE: Fact Statements 7,42,45, 68 and Conclusion 3 edited per 
Onyx's suggestions. P£F 7-18-01. 
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